Wage Differentials in Italy: Market Forces, Institutions, and Inflation by Christopher L. Erikson & Andrea Ichino
NBER WORKING PAPER SERIES





Working Paper No. 4922




Originally prepared for the NBER conference: "Differences and Changes in Wage Structures"
July 23-24, 1992, Cambridge, Massachusetts. Forthcoming in Freeman, It and L. Katz, (eds.)
"Differences and Changes in Wage Snctures", University of Chicago Press. The authors thank
Lai,nence Katz and Richard Freeman for providing comments on earlier drafts, as well as seminar
participants at the NBER conferences in September 1991 and July 1992, FlEE Stockholm and
the Swedish Institute for Social Research. Pietro Ichino spent much time in long and Insightful
discussions with us. We also thank Ignazio Visco, Giuseppe Presutto, and Franco Santarelli for
giving us access to the Bank of Italy, Assolombarda and Federmeccanica data sets, respectively.
Luigi Cannaxi, Paolo Sestito and Luigi Guiso of the Bank of Italy were exwemely patient in
answering many questions on the Bank of Italy data set Andrea Fioni was similarly helpful with
the Assolombarda data set. Mark Jerger and Federica Zagari were veiy dedicated research
assistants; the latter was occasionally helped by Patrizia Canziani, Roberto Benelli, Marco
Bolandrina, Davide Lombardo, Marco Reverdito, Roberto Torresetti and in particular Francesca
Nieddu and Carlo Tognato worked on inputting the Italian data sets. During the period this
research was conducted, Erickson was supported in part by the UCLA Institute of Industrial
Relations and Ichino was supported in part by IGIER and Fondazione Assicurazione Generali and
benefited from the hospitality of FlEE. This paper is part of NBER's research program in Labor
Studies. Any opinions expressed arc those of the authors and not those of the National Bureau
of Economic Research.
1994 by Christopher L. Erickson and Andrea Ichino. All rights reserved. Short sections of
text, not to exceed two paragraphs, may be quoted without explicit permission provided that full
credit, includingnotice, is given to the source.NBER Working Paper #4922
November 1994




During the 19705, Italy experienced an extreme compression of wage differentials, similar
to the better-known situation in Sweden. Most evidence suggests that this compression came to
a stop around 1982-83, coincident with a major institutional change (in the form of the escalator
clauseinItalian union contracts), a major economic change (the slowdown in inflation), a major
technologicalchange(industrialrestructuringandthe computerrevolution), anda major political
change (the loss of support for unions and their egalitarian pay policies). While we cannot
definitively distinguish among the relative influences of institutions, market forces, technology
and politicsonthe evolution of earnings inequality in Italy, our analysis of skill level wage
differentials and our comparisons at the individual level with the more laissez-fairc system of the
United States suggest that both inflation and egalitarian wage-setting institutions have importantly
influenced Italian wage compression in the regular sector of the economy. Yet, this very
compression may well have contributed to the flight away from the regular sector of the economy
at both ends of the skill distribution, plausibly leading to a greater overall degree of inequality
for the whole economy than is apparent from our analysis of wage differentials in the regular
sector.
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Los Angeles, CA 90024 ITALYDwing the 19?Os, Italy cxpeiicnczd an impxssive compression of wafle diffucntiais.
similat to th belier-known situation itt Sweden. Most evidence sugcsts that Ut compression
cane to astoparound 19S2-83, coincident ith a major irisUtudonai change (in the form of the
escaiator clause in Italian union contacts), a sn2jor economic change (the slowdown in inflation), a
major tscirnclo;ioi change (fridusui2l rcsuucruring and the compler. revolution), and a mijor
paiidcai change (the loss of support for unions tid their egalitathn jiaj policies). There. is some
sught evidence olre-opadng of differentials shtcc then, but the evidence is uneven, and even tic1t
a t-ocning is apparent. the devtc of inequality i still generjly below the level of the early- to
mid- I9Os.
In this chapter, we .nalywthe evolution of wage differentials across skill Lidoccupational
levels Lid individual chancte.istics in Italy (or wocke.s employed in the rcular sector of the
eonniv worken who are not self employed, have above grounC jobs, and arc not covered by
special lcw-w2ge uaThitg contracts. The evidence we provide is consistent %\iI); the view that
11.lions were abk to pvsh for institutional rcfo.-ms thu compressed wage differential in th:1970s.
nd that this egalhvian seni has bccn only partially, if at all, reversed in he 1950s. While %'t
can.notd:ñsthively distinguish among the relative influences of institutions, market forces.
tctciogy and politics on the evolution of ean'Jngs inequality in Italy, our analysts of skill level
differentials and our comparison at the individual level tith the more laissez4aixe system of the
Unhcd Stztcs su en thu both inflation and esziitalian wage-setting institutions have imponantly
influenced Italian %vflc ov;com:s.
In the nextsection,we descsibc th stylized csidenc.e on th recent evolution of wage
differentialsacross indsuics,occupational levels, and individuals. We then briefly layout, in
secdon 11, the institutional set-up of wage detennination InItaly. Wealso examine the evolution of
the compensation stnicrce and its effects on wage differentials across skill levels in iflela)-
rna.nufacrwing,conccntraiing in particular on the effects of inflation- Our primfl findings hre
are that the main rr.rber portion of 'es (the individually contracted part) and thc main
Institutional' ponioa (the esàiator payments) largely scrve to cancel eath other out, but that
inflatio., did have a sigriflcant effect .on wage compression before )9S3. less so recently.1i
section III, w eüxnhte the determinants of annual wage Lid salary income- and the degree of
inequality at the individual level, comparing raw inequality ana earnings re!ressions from a
representative sample of Italian househOlds nith the United States Current Population Survey: vc
find a sn&e Co 1t sedc.ornpensa'Jon str.ictire in Italy along almost all dimensioas.Lid a wcek
trend toward less inequaiityç lii narked contrast to the. U.S. Finally, 3t the concluding section, c
examine the possible impacts of ths comprcson on Self employment, the underground economy.
and low-wage training contracts, thrcc mechanisms tith may ht iiaeased ovthll inequality in
Italy but are not cap.urcd itt our quantitative analysis of the regular sector of the cconosny.
2Raw Evidence on Italian Earnings Inequality
'The main focus of this chapter is on earnings inequality across skillandoccupational
categories within sectors and across individual characteristics. First, however, we examine some
aggregate data on differentials across sectors. Figure 1 displays the coefficient of variation of blue
collar hourly wages across industries from1974 to1985 (after which the scales was discontinued).
Thefigure indicatesaclearcompressionof differentialsuntil1982: after1982 the dispersion of
blue collar wagesincreased somewhat,but remainedbelow its 3974 level in1985. Again,this
measure of inequality isnot ourprimary interest,but itgos back the furthest, and isconsistcnt
withthe view that differentials have not signilicantly widened recently.
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Figure 2 presents the ratio between average white collar and avenge blue collar monthly
wages within the metal-manufacturing scctor. Two scaics arc jrcscntcd best: the Assolombarda
series, consisting of metal-manufacturing firms in the Milan arca, and the rtdcrmcccca serics,
consisting of metal-manufacturing firms nation-wide.1 Once again, we observe an unambiguous
compression until 1983. followed by no clear trend in the Assolonibarda series and sonic evidence
These data acts have been previously analyzed in MAP 1986-1991 and Carniti Commission
1988. They arc described in greater detail in the data appendix, along with the other data acts used in this
chapter.
3of a widening of differentials in the Fcdermcccanica series, but not to the level of the mid- 1970s by
the beginning of the 1990s.
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Finally. Table 1 displays the standard deviation of the logarithm of annual earnings from
employment from a survey conducled for the Bank of Italy ova the period 1977-1987 (excluding
1931and1985).2 Atthisindividual Icvcl, we find a continuing downward trend in inequality; in
Section III,weanalyze this downward ucnd and the dctcrminants of individual labor income.
TABLE1DISPERSION OF INDIVIDUAL ANNUAL LABOR INCOME
Overall, then, we do not see a clear trend toward shrniflcant widening of wage inequality in
these findings, though the aggregate evidence does seem to indicate a leveling off of %C
2 The number given is die standard deviation of the log of earnings ham employment for Iull-titnc,
full-year. non-agricultural, non-self employed workcn between the ages of IS and 65. This data set is















Source: Banca D'lialiacompression around1982-83. Inthe nextsection, we will see what the institutional set-up of wage
determinationcan tell us aboutthetrendsweobservehere.
II Institutional Framework and VageDilTcrcntials:
Descriptive Evidence from the Metal-Manufacturing Sector
11.1 Jk Actors3
Three major unions (CCIL, CISL, Ut) have represented workers in Italy during the post-
war period. These unions had their origins at the beginning of the cold war with the splitting of a
unified union undergovernmentand U.S. pressures aimed at isolating the Italian Conirnunist Party
(PCI). The three unions were initially, and to some extent still nrc, characterized by different
political inspirations, more or less related to the three main strains of Italian politics: communist.
christian democratic, and social democratic, respectively. The political pressures tosplit the Italian
labor movementwere, however, notentirelysuccessful, giventhat afteradecadeand for most of
the remaining postwar periodthethreeunionshave acted together.Ibilowinga unified strategy,
particularlyinpursuing egalitariancompensation policies, it isonlyrecently, as we shall see
below,that theyhave disagreed on some majcrsubstantiveissues, andin particular onthereform
ofthe indentionsystem.
Itshould be noted that CGIL, CISL and tilL are confederations of scetoral unions, The
extent to which bargaining strategies are coozdinatcd across sectors is not, however, immediately
clear. Yet, some sectors seem to have played a leading role in the bargaining process; this is
particularly true for the metal-manufacturing sector, on which we will focus our analysis in this
section. Contractsin metalmanufacturing cover a vast arrayof industries,includingall metal
transformationaciLvitics:industrial,electrical, and transportation tnachinciy,computers,other
precision instruments andseveralsmaller metal and machinery industries.4Unionshave
traditionally had their strongholds in these industries, and,therefore,metal-manufacturing
contracts have often been the first to introducc significant ito-worker rules later extended to other
sectoral bargaining units. On a few occasions, metal-manufacturing contracts have even been
translated into law,
See Nculcld 1960, Ciugni1984,and Locke 1992 for more cxtcnsive English language analysis of
Italian industrial relations hissosy and stnicwre.
Metal-manufacturing workers accounted for approximately I!)ofall non-self emnploycd
ifldUstnal workers and 1/10o(allnon-self employed workers 'in 1990; we say 'npproximately Souse it
is not possible to know exactly bow many workers are covered by the terms of the metal-manufacturing
contract. Metal-manufacturing production acaunted 1cr 38% of total industrial production. Sourcc
conruidustria,
5All private industrial employers are represented by a single association (CovsJindustria)
that has traditionally played the leading role in bargaining. Other similar associations represent
cmploycrs in the other main sectors (trade, other Services, artisans, agriculture), and an important
role is also played by the association of companies that arc partially owned by the government
(PartecipazioniStatali) butoperate under marketnñcs.Finally, the role of the public
administration as anemployerhas become increasinglyimportant, particularlyinrecentyears
during which, in contrast to the past. industrial relations outcomes in the public sector have started
to influence die private sector.5
The relative strength of workers' unions and employers' associations, and the extent to
which they have been able to achieve their bargaining goals, have gone through quite substantial
swings in the postwar period; we identify three major phases here. The 1950s and 1960s were a
period of relative weakness of unions, although some initial steps were undertaken toward the
construction of the strongly pro-worker legislation that now characterizes Italian industrial
relations.6 The Auliuino Caldo (Hot Autumn) of 1969 was the first important turning point: a
period of widespread social unrest and acute class conflict which gave unions enormous popular
support and bargaining power. The result was a tremendous pro-worker shift in legislation and
bargaining outcomes: the most important example is the S:auao dci tLavora:ori (Charter of
Workers Rights) that provided the world-famous Italian workers' protection against firing as well
as other significant labor market regulations that heavily constrained the freedom of employS in
the labor markcl
During the 1970s, the achievement of an egalitarian distribution of income was one of the
focal objectives of unions, and given their relative strength during this period, thcy were able to
induce a strong compression of wage differentials. Several collcctive contracts in the catty l970s
granted equal contractual increases to all workers, and in 1975 a new indexation system. to which
we will return below, provided for cqual increases to all workers for each percentage point of
inflation. 'The slogan "equal pay for all work" would have been subscribed to by most union leaders
during this period, and it is difficult to doubt that a large part of the compression of wage
differentials observed in the 1970s (see section I) was caused by the unions' successful pursuit of
egalitarian pay policies.
The march against unions by 40,000 high-level white collar workers in Turin (the location
of FIAD in the fall of 1980 may be considered the second turning paint. The compression of wage
differentials had readied a threshold Of unacceptability for high-skilled workers, and their
PaztieuL-irly important was thewaveof contact renewals in public administration in die bte
l9SOs that granted large wage increases to public sector' workers and apparcndy caused a ratchet circa on
private sector workers.
o For cxaznp!c laws on la)vl1s and firing, on the prolection ci female workers, and on die
prohibition of gender and regional based contractual pay differences.
6opposition to egaiitarianism. probably latent in the previousyears.caine explicitly to the surface.
In the meantime, the process of heavy plant restructuring, spurred by the oil shocks and begun in
the kite 1970s, had extended to a large part of the industrial sector, resulting in major layoffs in the
industrialized regions. The unions progressively began to lose members and public support, due in
no small measure to their inabilitytoprotect less-skilled workers from layoffs and the opposition of
the high-skilled wo!kcrs to egalitarianism.
Table 2 presents some illustrative figures on this recent diminution of union strength. The
first Iwo columns report measures of strike activity for the national industrial sector and for the
Lombardy metal-manufacturing sector, respectively: both series display a significant decrease in
the number of hours lost to labor conflicts after j9337The last column reports union
membership for the metal-manufacturing sector in the Milan area. Different definitions of the
'Milan area" in the publications from which these numbers were taken cast doubt on the exact
comparability of these numbers across years. We are, nevertheless, confident about the basic
message that can be taken front this column: union membership has been steadily falling since the
mid- I 970s, with a significant drop at the beginning of the 1980s.
The result of these trends was a loss of bargaining power from which the three traditional
major unions do not seem 10 have recovered. Furthcmtore, new corporative unions representing
sinaI! groups of workers in crucial positions have acquired substantial power, particularly in public
sector scrvicq, exaccrbating the current weakness of the traditional Italian labor ,flovemenL All of
this adds up to a labor movement with a diminished ability (and perhaps willingness) to push
through their egalitarian pay policies.
11.2flj baitaining structure lnquadramcnto8
On the basis of an extensive interpretation of the Constitution. and in the absence of rules
concerning unions' certification, collective contracts signed by the three main unions have crga
omncs validity as far as compensation is concerned (i.e. they apply to all workers regardless of
union status). Therefore, in Italy union membership may differ dramatically front union coverage:
the latter is always virtually 100% within each unit for which a collective contract is signed.
Furthermore, collective contracts have on a few occasions been Iranslatcd into law. Hence, the
An additional interesting fact concerning the significant reduction of strike activity in 1978 is
that that was the year of the kidnapp'mg of the Cuistian Democrat leader Aldo Morn by the Red Brigades.
A government of national solidarity against terrorism and the economic otis, with the external support of
the PCI. was put in power on that ocosion. The general feeling of national solidarity against the Red
Brigaics, shared by the PCI, contributed to the decrease iii strike activity.
httu,t on the lulian bargaining suucture and on the iuadtamento is large; we draw in
particular on Cannel 1987andP. Ichino 1992.
7influence of unions has reachedthose parts ofthe economy that the unions have not directly
organized.
TABLE 2LABOR CONFLICTS AND UNION MEMBERSHIP,1914-1990
Average number of hoursTotal numberofhourslost CGIL, CI & UIL
Year lost to strikes per month,
(entireindustrial sector)1







1975 8424 19930 200238
1976 10653 29553 19373$
1917 4138 17598 191108
197$ 2604 7773 184721
1979 9685 28947 183486
1980 11859 18549 179434
1981 4067 10372 115340
1982 4369 25267 t02524
1983 6216 19035 91568
19S4 800 5676 78574
1985 1276 4531 72717
1986 1182 2894 67854
1987 &12 2705 42819




1) Average of the Janwuy, April. July and October number of hours lost to strikes in millions, from
the Bank of Italy.
2) Total number of hours lost in each ya in thousands, from Annuario di Statisiichc dcl Lavoro,
ISTAT (Official Italian statistical office).
3) Number of members of the RM (Federation of metal-manufacturing wostcrs); this is the
confederation that jointly organizes CGIL, CISL and UIL workers in metal-manufacturing.
Source: Thesc data were collected at the FLM historical archive in Milan.
alIai-gaining takes place at the national, scctoral, provincial and firm levels. Essentiallyall
aspects of labor relations may be a subject of negotiations, as long as the bargaining outcome is at
least as favorable for the workers as what is implied by the law. Bargaining at the national or
provincial level can be characterized as a state-contingent process in the sense that it usually
occurs when specific issues of general relevance need to be discussed; as farascompensation
differentials are concerned, the most important issue discussed at the national level has been the
indexation system. In contrast, sectoral and finn level bargaining are better characterized as time-
contingent processes. Typically, sectoral contracts last approximately three years and, after the
signing of cacti scctoraJ contract, bargaining at the firm level begins. The sectorat contract provides
a wage floor for the firm level, but bargaining does not necessarily occur at the flint level. Indeed,
during the early l980s Confindustria often advised its members not to bargain on wages at the firm
level; moreover, unions at. that time did not have enough strength, in many firms, to push the
discussion of wage increases beyond those granted by the sectoral contract.
Many of the outcomes of collective agreements are diffcrentiatcd across workers according
to a skill ranting system. The law first divides non-self employed workers into four categories:
blue collar workers, white collar workers, quadd and managers. The nature of the occupation,
whether manual or intellectual, traces the border line between blue collar workers and the other
categories, while the amount of directive responsibilities traces the distinctions among the higher
categories. High level while collar workers with directive responsibilities, known as the quadri,
were first recognized by the law as a separate category in 1985. However, after the march of the
40,000 in 1980, collective contracts and employers acting indcpcndentiy from the contracts had
already started to grant them some preferential treatment, The process that led to the recognition
of the quadri as a separate category was one of the many signs that the compression of differentials
achieved in the l970s had gone too far for the unions' constituencies and the public at large.
\Vitliin the ranks of the non-managerial workers, collective contracts at the sectoral level
further subdivide workers into several quasi-skill categories called inqvsadranjenro lewis. Wages
and working conditions are attached to these levels and contracts establish whichypes of workers
are in which level; instead ofjob descriptions, there are inquadramento descriptions.
In the 195G and 1960s there were different inquadraniento levels for blue collar and white
collar workers, while the quadri category did not yet exist. The distinction between blue collar
workers and white collar workers was, however, in evident contrast to the egalitarian goals of the
unions, Therefore, during their period of strength in the early 1970s, the unions tried to push,
through collective bargaining, for the Inquadramento(Jnico: a singleranking structure for blue
collar antI white collar workers. The goal Was to inak-c explicit the equivalence of the skill content
of manual and intcllcctual work, '[he attempt was, however, only partially succcssful, with blue
9and whitecollar workersrank-cdtogether only in the bottom half of the inquadraniento while only
white collar workers were ranked in the upper half.
In the metal-manufacturing sector, for example, there arc eight inquadr'.unento levels.9
All blue collar workers arc ranked in the first five levels; some blue collar workers with dirccijve
responsibilities arc called intermediates" and are rankcd in the fourth and (11th levels. White collar
workers are ranked in all levels but the first. Finally, the quadri arc ranked in the seventh level.
Thus, despite die egalitarian gains of the unions, it is possible to identify 15 different skill ranks of
workersin metal-manufacturing: 5blue collar levels, 2 intcnncdiate levels, 7 white collars levels
and1 levelfor the quadri.
Our analysis inthis section is based on theavenge monthlywages for these categories of
workersfor samplesof firmsfrom twodatasets.The Assolonibardadataset iscollectedby the
Lombardysection of Confindustriafrom questionnaires sentto metal-manufacturing firms in the
Milan Area.Thisdataset provides fairlydisaggregated information on die componentsofthe
compensationpackage. The Federmeccanica datasetis collectedbythe metal-manufacturing
sectionof Confindustriaandisbasedonfirmsinthewhole country,but provides morelimited
information on components of the compensation package)°
First, we believe it is Impotiant to get a sense of the extent of homogeneity of these 15
categories across firms. in terms ofmonthly compensation.FromdieAssolonibardadata set;e
have access to the avenge monthly wages paid by each firm to the workers in cacti of the 15
categories for the years 1983-1990. The inquadramento level of the workers explains
approximately 80% - 90% of the total variance of avenge monthly wages across inquadramento
levels and firms. Furthermore, the (employment weighted) within-inquadraniento coefficient of
variation of the avenge monthly wages paid across the firms in die sample is never above 10%
(i.e. the standard deviation is never larger than 10% of the mean).
Looking separately at blue collar workers and white collar workers, there is the most
homogeneity within the central ranks of each of the two groups. It should be kept in fund,
however, that very few firms in the Assolonibarda data set rank workers in due lowest blue collar
and white collar levels, so the coeflicients of variation are not very significant for these two levels.
In the rest of our analysis based on the Assolonibarda data set we will drop these two levels, loin-
inquadramento pay for white collar workers seems to be on avenge less homogeneous than for
blue collar workers, and for high white collar levels the coefficient of variation is significantly
larger. 'There is, then, apparently less pay homogeneity across firms at high inquadnmento levels.
The levels arc numbered from 1 to 7, but an additional category called 5-super has been added
between the fifth and the sixth levels.
10 Furtherdescriptions of these twodatasct.c are providedindiedata appendix.
I0Since we do not have access to individual wages in these data sets, we have little to say
about within-firm variability. Limiting ourselves to differences across farms, we take the above as
evidence thai inquadramcnto levels explain a large part of the variability of monthly compensation.
In other words, workers in a given level seem to receive fairly similar wages in different firms,
although ibis is less true the higher the skill level. If one is willingtobelieve that wage homogeneity
reflects skill homogeneity, and in the absence of better measures, inquadr.uncnto levels can then be
considered as fairly satisfactory proxies for skill ranks.
The distribution of workers across inquadramento levels has undergone interesting changes
in recent years. The Federmeccanica data set contains information on the proportion of workers in
each level which is comparable across years. Between 1976 and 1991 the proportion of blue collar
workers in the don-managerial metal-manufacturing labor force decreased from 75.8% to 63.5%.
This decrease seems to have been mainly the to a decrease in the proporlion of workers in the three
lowest inquadraniento levels; since relatively few workers arc ranked in the first two levels, most of
the decrease in the blue collar fraction of the labor force comes from the third level. As for white
collar workers, the increase in their proportion of the labor force is almost entirely due to an
increase in the proportion of workers ranked in the two highest levels.These trends arc
particularly evident between 1976 and 1987.
This evidence suggests that the metal-manufacturing sector underwent a significant change
in the composition of its labor force across inquadramento levels between 2976 and 1987. There
are two principal interpretations of this change in composition.First, inasmuch as the
inquadramento levels reflect skill levels, there may have been a shift away hoot lower skills and
toward higher skill; Unfortunately, with our data, we have no way to measure how much of this
shift was due to labor demand forces and how much to labor supply forces.
Second. these trends may simply be the result of internal promotions during a period in
which employment growth in the metal-manufacturing sector was minimal. In cenflhizcd
bargaining systems, upgrading is a typical response to market forces pushing for more wage
dispersion, resulting ultimately in an implicit lam of wage drift. Again, however, we cannot
disentangle with our data the extent to which these trends in the composition of the labor force
reflect technological shifts toward more skill-intensive produclion and the extent to which they
represent a form of wage drift. While reading the succeeding sections, though, keep in mind that
on top of the wage drift that we will explicitly measure (as the non-collectively contracted portion
of the compensation package), wage drift is also likely to have taken place implicitly through
promotions.
1111.3 Ib compensalion struclure j! compensilion differentials1
The structure of the typicalcompensationpackage for an Italian industrial workcr is
detailed in Table 3. 'The contractualminimumis determined at the .sectoral bargaininglevel;the
indexation system (scala nwbik = escalator), regulated by sectoral bargaining or by law, is
thought of as protection for the purchasing power of the contractual minimum. 'These two
components make up the contractual compensation. Bargaining at the firm level acids to this (loot a
wage increase called the collective superminirnum and a component called the production premium;
the latter component originally had an incenlivc function that was abandoned in the 1970s under
union pressure, though it still remains in the compensation package. Morc recently, annual
bonuses, sometimes in the form of profit sharing, and plant level incentive components have also
been introduced into firm level bargaining; seniority increases, in contrast, have always been
determined at the sectoral level. The individual superminimuni is the last component of the so-
called base monthly compensation: it is determined by the employer outside of any direct influence
by unions - as we will see, because of this feature, it has played a significant role in the
determination of wage differentials.
Adding some minor extraordinary payment&2 and overtime payments,'3 we get to the
total monthly compensation. The annual compensation is not just equal to twelve monthly
installments, however, because in addition to the annual bonuses mentioned above, at least one Qy
law), or two or in sonic cases up to four additional months" are added according to the scctoral
contracts. Finally, severance payments are granted by law in any case ofjob separation.
Not all ol these components arc equally important, particularly as far as wage differentials
are concerned. As shown in Table 4, the contractual minimum, the cumulated scala mobile
payments14 and the individual superminimum accounted for between 80% and 90% of the total
monthly wage in 1991 in each inquadramento level, though their relative weights varied, as will be
discussed below. Furthermore, bccause oveilinie payments, severance payments and 13th month
(and above) installments depend on the base monthly compensation, the behavior of these three
componenLs essentially shape the behavior of the entire compensation package. In the remainder of
this subsection, we describe the evolution and the determinants of these three key components.
The data sets on wbich this section is based have becn used by several pcvious researchers. This
section owes a lot to that literature, particularly MAP 1986-1991, Carniti Commission 1988. Biagioli
1985,Biagioli 1988, Frey1988, Bordogna 1988. and Lucifora and Presutto 1990.
2 P:iynienLs For missionsorcompensatingpayments forspecificjob dsaractcristia. for cxample.
13 Overtime paymcnts are not ilcluded in the monthly compensation data wt usc in the rest of this
section.
14 Here and elsewhere in the figures and tables, we refer to scala mobile payments cuinulaicd sitice
1981.
12TABLE 3THESTRUCTUREOF THE TYPICAL COMPENSATION PACKAGE'
Contractual minimum (scctox)
+










+l3di-l4th months, cit.(sector Ilaw)




The bargaining level at wiiicb the component is discussed, or whether it is determined bylaw, is in
parcnuJicscs.
13TABLE 4 MAIN COMPONENTSOFTHEMONTHLY WAGE AS A PERCENTAGE OFTHE








BC2 31.47 5838 031 2.67 6.96
8C3 31.62 53.12 1.30 2.95 11.01
BC4 31.76 49.91 3.27 4.01 11.05
tICS 32.35 45.62 334 3.96 1433
1N4 31.19 49.06 6.75 2.60 10.40
1N5 30.35 42.80 12.10 4.54 10.20
WC3 31.54 53.00 3.04 444 7•97
\\'C4 31.22 49.08 4.83 5.86 9.01
WC5 3133 44.47 9.92 5.18 8.90
WC5S 30.28 3936 1437 4.15 11.63
WC6 30.18 35.57 21.48 5.16 7.62
WC7 29.47 27.91 30.06 4.22 8.34
QU7 26.15 23.11 3839 4.16 7.98
Source: Assotombarda
142k contractual minimum
As previously mentioned, the floor of the entire wage structure is the contractual minimum,
establishedat thesectoral bargaining level. For each inquadramento level and for each year of the
contract, a minimum wage is agreed upon. As shown in Table 4 this component amounted to
approximately 30% of total monthly wage in each inquadramento level in 1991.
With the exception of a few contracts in the early 1970s. conLracted minimum increases
have always displayed sonic differentiation across inquadramento levels. Nevertheless, the
compressionof differentials for contracted levels continueduntil the end of the 1970s. For metal-
manufacturinginthe Milanarea,these trends are shown in Figure 3)5 In 1976thecontracted
tnininiuzn for white collar workers in the seventh lcvcl was 80% more than for blue collar workers
in ilie second level. 'Ibis percentage fell to 60% in 1979 and then grew nawc or less steadily up to
1991: inthisyearthe Itigl testcontracted tuinimuta was almost twice the lowest.
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Figure 3 alsoshows the samedispersion measure fortotalmonthlycompensation)6 This
differential islarger thanthe contractedone in cvay year and has aU-shape, with aminimum in
Each point in this figure represents a compensation ndo between the seventh while collarlevel
andthe second blue collarlevel, withthe exception of the upper okcrvatiocs on monthly compensation
co5t-1987
(see next (oomotc).
6 After t%1 thefigure reports two maxhnin ,utions for total competisation. The upper one uses the
avengewagc of die quadri as the max. This should not w—.-.ily be interpreted as a widening of
differentials withrespecttopreviousyears,sincethe category of the quadri was acated by splitting the
seventhwhite collarcategory. As discussed abovc thequadristarted being treated differentlylong before
151983; this minimum occurs four years after the minimum of the contracted differential. In ocher
words, despite the fact that contractcd differentials began to widen iA the late-1970s, total
differentials continued to compress. If the contracted minimum plus scala mobile component is
considered (the third series displayed in Figure 3). the max/mm ratio for this series also keeps
decràasing until 1983. ibis evidence suggests that inflation, in conjunction with the indexation
system, bore major responsibility for the compression of monthly wage differentials between 1979
and 1983.
caJn mobile'7
Indexation has a long and conflictual history in Italy. full of consequences for the evolution
of w.ue diuicrentials.'Ilie first escalator (scala mobile) was intnxltuccd in bargaining at the
national level ininicdiatcly after the war. For each unit increase in the price index, equal wage
increases (called punli di coruingestza=points) were paid to workers in all sectors and
inquadraniento levels, but the increases were differentiated by region (lower in the south), gender
(lower for women), and age (lower for young workers). A reference basket of goods was
established, which remains essentially unchanged today. 'The agreement, initially proposed by
Confindustria. was explicitly interpreted by the parties as an exchange of indexation for social
peace.
The provision of equal scala payments for all workers (which ensured 300% coverage for
the mean worker's contracted wage in 1946) clearly induced a compression of wage differentials. It
also essentially provided zero coverage for subsequent contracted wage increases; yet, on the other
hand, since the punti di contingenza were paid for each unit increase in the price index (rather than
for each percentage point drop in the mean worker's real wage, for cxamplc), this system
accelerated the reaction of wages to inflation. Such a system. therefore, requires periodic
adjustments. first to provide coverage for subsequent contracted wage increases, and second to
reduce die built in acceleration of the wage-price spiral.
'flie compression of differentials caused by this indexation system, in conjunction with the
high post war inflation, soon lcd to calls for the diniination of the egalitarian aspects of the
escalator. The system was slightly changed in 1951: the new system was still based on points, hut
the escalator increases were differentiated to provide 100% coverage for each mnquadraniento level
and to maintain inter-inquadramento differentials on a 100-239 scale Irotn the lowest blue collar
this split The luguic indicates, though, that the differential utaunent of the quadji. bidden in die seventh
level before 1981. was indeed significant
For additional infonnation on the debate concerning the scala mobile and on its history, see
D'Apicc 1975, Quarchioni 1979. C.N.E.L 1983, AlIeva1986, Faustini 1987, and Mariani 1991.
16level to the highest white collar level. All other aspects remained unchanged, including zero
coverage for future wage increases and the built-in accelerator.
The scala mobile maintained this same basic structure until the niid-1970s, with periodic
readjustnicnts to provide coverage (or interim contracted wage increases and to reduce the reaction
speed of the escalator. One major change, concerning not only the indention system but also
contracted wages, was the elimination by law of scala mobile payments and contracted wage
differentiation by gender, age and region. 'The escalator, originally introduced in bargaining, was
cxtendcd by law to the entire industrial sector in 1960. With few exceptions (the financial sector.
for example) it was extended through contracts to the rest of the economy, although its nontrivial
drawbacks in term of coverage and wage-price spiral were already evident.
ilien, when union strength increased dramatically after the Autunno Caldo. the unions
sought changes in the system. Most obviously, the egalitarian aspirations of the early 1970s
clashed with the dulTettntiation of scala mobile payments across inquxiramento levels: in addition,
given the large contracted wage increases of the early 1970s, and despite the periodic
readjustnients. the coverage provided by the system had decreased, Finally, the fiit appearance of
oil shock inflation suggested to the unions the nced for better protection of real wages.
Upon the union? request to Confindustria, a returntoa fully egalitarian escalator was
negotiated in 1975: the panics agreed on a two year transition ba syslem where all workers would
receive, at a quarterly frequency, equal escalator increases for each point increase of the price
index in the previous quarter (i.e., similar to the 1945-46 system, but without differentiation by
region, gender aijage).l3 •the scala point was set equal to the highest point of the previous
system (upward equalization). In addition, a quite subtanlial fixed sum was paid to all workers as
compensation for the lack of full coverage of interim wage increases under the old systenL A 1977
law prohibited escalator systems more favorable to workers than the escalator negotiated in 1975:
this implied dc facto legal extension of the industrial sector escalator to the entire economy.
Somewhat surprisingly, the two major drawbacks of the previous system (zero coverage of
subsequent contracted increases and acceleration of the wage-price spiral) remained in place, while
the potential for dramatic comprcssionasy effects on wage differentials in a countxy already facing
inflation in double digits was built in. In addition, the average coverage was dramatically raised by
the upward equalization of the putt, increasing real rigidities potentially incompatible with the
consequences of the oil shocks.
Indeed, between 1975 and 1983, while inflation fluctuated between 10% and 20% (FIgure
4), the potential for wage compression became a reality, as shown by the evidence presented in the
18 Note die similarity of this system to the escalator dauscs in many U.S. union contracts: in the
automobile and aerospace industries, for cxamplc, COLA rI,Iw often specify across-the-board cents-per-
hour wage inavascs for given inacascs in the consumer price index.
17first section andinFigure 3: the dispetsion of all the measures we consider (except the contracted
minimumalone) and in particular the contracted plus scala mobile component of the compensation
package display a continuing compression until 1982-83. Despite the increasing high-skilled
workers' opposition to wage compression, unionsremainedattached to the egalitarian nature of the
scalamobile. They also opposed any attemptsto cutthe degree of coverageandthereaction speed
of the escalator.
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On theselatter issues,however,the threeunions caine to fundamental disagreement after
many yearsofunifiedaction, In 1983,CISLand tilL joined in an agreementwithemployers
(spearheadedbythegovcnimcnt) which implementeda 15% downward adjustmentinthe degreeof
coverage, followedin 1984by a predeterminedcap on scalapayments. Thecommunist majoiity
withinthe CGIL opposed the agreements, and togetherwith thePCItheypushed for a referendum
against the 1984 agrccmcnt. ilie rtfcrenduni, held in 1985, acquired a political importance that
wentfar beyond the relevance of themoneyinvolved:it became a referendum onthescala luobile.
The result was a defeal for thePCI andthe CGILthat signalled the S ofthe oldindention
sysleni.
On the wave of the referendum results, Confindustria was strong enough to fully reject as
a wide the old indention system. However,the bargaining processover a new system between
Conflndusuiaand theunionscame to a dead end, The Government was thatfore compelled to
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abandoned for something analogous to a progressive tax system: 100% coverage for a portion of
the contracted compensation (equivalent to the contractual minimum of a medium level workcr).
with the retiiaiixlcr up to the total contractual compensation (contractual minimum plus scala
mobile: see Table 3) indexed at 25%. All other compensation components were uncovered. The
average overall degree of indexation was approximately 50% for blue collar workers and 40% for
white collar vorkers.
The law expired in 1990 and was extended for one year in the hopes that the parties would
reach a solution. In December 1991 tIc parties decided to suspend the existing indention system
(begun in1986) andtoopen,in June 1992, a new bargaining round aimed at a comprehensive
reform of the entire compensation system, inducting indexation. The trade unions, the employers
and the government came to a first agreement at the end of July 1992.Despitethe strong
oppositionof thecommunist left in the CCLtheJulyagreementbroughtthedeath ofthe scala
mobile:in exchangeforthe elimination of the indention system.Italian workers wereto receive
monthly lumpsum paymentsbeginning inJanuary1993equal, foreveryone, toslightlymorethan
1%of die monthly wageofthelowest levelbluecollar worker in1990. In addition,bargaining at
thefirmlevelwassuspended bytheJulyagreementuntil the end of 1993.19
This agreement clearlyhasthe flavorof a large concession from workerstoemployers,
andin fact generatedmuch opposition among someunionmembers. In addition, the subsequent
exchangerate crisisof theLit-a,initialedin September 1992 and followedby a stabilization
programproposed by the government, made the July agreement even more difficultforthe unions'
base constituency to accept:thedevaluation generated a widespread fearof growinginflation inthe
absence of indention,while thestabilizationprogram(more taxes and fewer social expenditures)
contradicted some of the commitments madein July by thegovernmenL
Returningto the 1986reform,it apparently did not induce very much differentiationacross
inquadrainentolevcls Figure3 indicates that the niax/min ratio of the contracted minimum plus
scala mobile component increased only slightlyinthc late 1980s, although the differential forthe
contracted increase shows a more marked upward trend. We see inTable4 that in 1991 the
portion of total compensation accountedfor by thescalamobilepayments cumulatedsince1981
stillshrinksaswemove tohigherinquadrainento levels; duringthe1980s,theindention system
did not fully protectthewages of high-skilled workers. Table4seems, however, to suggest that
the third main component of the compensation package, the individual supenninimurn. has at least
partially compensated the high-skilled workers for the low coverage provided by the scala mobile
system.
19 As for the comprchensivc discussion of the entire compensation structure, the agreement only
mentions a generic commitment of the parties to discuss the issue in futwt bargaining rounds.
19mc collecliveth individual suneniiinima
Bargaining at the firm levelhasclearlyinfluencedwage differentials. The main portion of
thecompensation packagethat isdetermined at thislevelis the COllectiVeSuperinifliniunt(5cc Table
3).The ratio between the highest and the lowest inquadrainento levels for the cross-firm avenge of
this wage component (from the Assoloinbarda data set) ranged from 233 in 1976 to 339 in 1991,
whilefor the contractedniininium theratio ranged from 187 to 201 over the same time period;
however, the collective supcrminimumratio isstill relatively smallif wecompareit tothe ratiofor
theindividual superminimum, which ranged from3670 in1976to 12708 in 1991.
Theindividual superminimuni is the part of the monthly wage that is determined by the
employer specifically for each worker and, therefore, is the only component of the compensation
package that is not regulated by collective bargaining or by tue law. As shown in Table 4, this
component is practically insignificant at low inquadramento levels but grows to almost 40% of the
compensation package at thehighestwhite collar level. All together, ibis evidence suggests that the
individual superminimum is the main instrument by which individual employer-worker bargaining
influences wage dispersion.
Sonic interesting descriptive evidence on the role of this component is provided in Table 5.
Thistable,based onFederineccanica data, displays the following decomposition of the annual
increase in monthly compensation:
(wT, (WCS1'\ ____
log) = logL,.w-r1) 9- lO\vcs
where: WT= total monthly compensation, WCS =contractedminimum wage plus cumulated Scala
mobile, and t indexes years. That is, the total percentage monthly wage increase between two
years can be decomposed into the sum of the percentage increase due to the scala mobile and the
contract, plus the log of the ratio between the total wage and the contracted plus scala mobile
portion. illis last terni is known in the literature as the drift rate.2° Table 5presents,for each
inquadr.unento lcvel. the averages of these three terms for the 1976-1982 and the 1983-1990
periods. This data set does not offer separate information on the individual supermininlum and
therefore we can only examine the overall drift. We know, however, from the above evidence that
as far as differentials are concerned the individual superminimum is the most important component
of the drift.
20 See,for example, HibbsandLocking 1991.
20TABLES DECOMPOSITION OF THE TOTALMONTHLYWAGE INCREASE
INTHENATION-WIDEMETAL-MANUFACTURINGSECTOR
lnquadraxncnto level 1976-1982 avcrag 1983-1990 averages
total wage drift contracttotal wage drift contract
growth plus scalagrowth plus scala
nd 18.50 13.71 4.79 734 12.07 -4.53
BC2 17.61 16.33 1.28 7.43 14.31 -6.83
BC 17.18 19.49 -232 7.90 19.40 -11.51
0C4 16.90 20.77 -3.87 7.96 21.52 -13.56
BCS 16.57 22.29 -5.72 8.20 24.81 -16.60
1N4 16.51 28.32 -11.81 8.01 27.69 -19.68
INS 15.60 33.89 -18.28 827 31.08 -22.81
WC2 17.87 13.79 4.08 6.93 10.12 -3.18
WC3 1735 20.45 -2.90 7.05 17.81 -10.75
WC4 17.04 25.20 .8.16 7.07 21.92 -14.85
WCS 15.64 29.48 -13.84 7.S8 29.75 -21.87
WC5S 15.06 33.35 -18.28 7.98 34.01 -26.04
WC6 13.92 41.00 -27.08 839 45.92 -37.33
WC7 14.91 62.11 -47.20 10.08 73.36 -63.29
Source: Fcdezmcccanica
Looking at total wage growth in the diffcreni inquadramento levels, the compression of
wage ciillcrcntials in the flnt sub-period and the expansion in the second appear evident.21 But
what is most stiiking in this table is tic cxistcncm of a scissor between tic drift rate and the
increase due to the contract plus the scala mobile, which grows larger as we move across
inquadramento levels.Noticealso that in the second sub-period the size of the scissor clearly
widens, particularly in the higher white collar levels. Combining the evidence provided by this
table and by FIgure 3. it seems that the disequalizing effect of the drift rate became greater in the
second sub-period, when inflation was lower, but that this component has acted primarily to offset
the equalizing effect of the escalator.
21 Keep in mind that while white collar (WC) inquadramcnto levels arc listed after blue collar (BC)
let in the labi; BC and WC workers in the same level arc comparable in cnn of the contracted
portion of the compcnsation package.
2111.4Inliation jygg dispersion
Given the above evidence, it can be argued that inflation affrcicd wage differentials
through two intenelaled channels, one direct and one indirect. 'The direct channel worked through
the egalitarian indexation mechanism and generated a eomprcssionary effect on the wage
distribution. 'The indirect channel worked instead through (lie drift: the higher inflation, the greater
is likely to have been the extent of the use of the drift on the part of cnaployers to offset the
compression caused by the scala mobile; this second channel generatcd an expansionary effect on
the wage distribution.
Since the percentage increase in total wage dispersion is a function of changes in the
dispersion due to the escalator and to the drift, one can estimate the reduced form overall effect of
inflation on die change in total wage dispersion and thus get a sense of which of these two channels
prevailed. The results of this reduced form estimation arc contained in the following equation.
estimated over the 1976-1990 period on Federmeccanica data:
log (vCTt ) = 0.19-1.S7infiaiion +O.Olcosurac:- 0.O6quadri
(006) (0.41) (0.04) (0.05)
where VWT is the variance of the log of monthly wages across inquadraniento levels (excluding
the quadri). coniroc: is a dummy variable that takes value one in the years in which a contract is
signed and quadriisa dummy variable that takes the value I for the years in which die quadri were
separated [ruin the seventh white collar level. Inflation, through the scala mobile and the drift,
clearly bad a strong negath'e and significant effect on the perccntagc change in wage dispersion.
Therefore, die discqualizixig effect of the wage drift was not strong enough to completely offset the
compression of dificrentials caused by thc indexation system.
On the other hand, when we distinguish between the two sub-periods analyicd in Table 5,
we obtain the following result:
log ('c )= 0.07 - 0.96inflatiunl + 0.23inflation2 + 0.O3contract - (LOSquatIri t- (O.0t)(0.52) (1.13) (0.04) (0.01)
where istJiationl (injlaiion2) is equal to inflation for the years 1976-1982 (1983-1990) and zero
otherwise, and the other variables arc defined as above. I-tern we sec that inflation significantly
compressed wages only until 1982.After 1982, inflationdoes not seem to have affected wage
differentials, despite the persistently egalitarian nature oftheescalator. Thissuggeststhatin the
second sub-period the disequalizing effect of the drift became relatively stronger and capable of
practically offsetting the effect of the escalator.
22What we have found, then, is that a large part of the compression generated by 20 years of
inflationand egalitarianinstitutions seems to still be present. We next see what we can learn front
individual dataanda comparison with the United States, where egalitarian wage-setting institutions
clearlyplaya much less significantrole.
III Individual CharacteristicsandEarningsInequality:
A Comparison or Italy andtheUnited States
We nowturntoan analysis ofindividual-level data on the determinantsofannual wage
and salary earningsin Italy.usingtheUnited Statesasa bcnchniart We first describe the trends
in educational attainment and the age structures of our samples of workers in the two countries
over the period under study, 1978-1987, findIng roughly similar age structures and a higher
average level of educational attainment in the U.S., but a trend toward more educated s'ork forces
in both countries. We then examine returns to schooling and experience and measures of overall
earnings inequality in the two countries. Our main findings here arc that overall inequality and
returns to skill (asmeasured by the variability of actual and residual log earnings and the return to
a college degree) are unambiguously higher in the U.S.thanin Italy. and that while inequality has
clearly increased intheU.S., the pattern is less clear in Italy - indicating, if anything, a trend
toward a less unequal distribution.
111.1 pj
'flte Italian data source is a representative household survey collected by a private
company for ilic l3anca D'ltalia over the period 1978-1987. excluding 1981 and 1935; we shall
refer to this data set as BDI.22 For the U.S., we use the March Current Population Survey (CE'S).
Several data limitations for BDI require discussion. Mist, the dependent variable is the log of
annual earnings horn employment net of taxes, which does not have an exact equivalent in the
CE'S; we use CI'S annual gross wage and salary earnings.23Schooling and age are not
conhinuous in ODI, but are segmented into five and six categories, respectively (schooling
calceories: no schooling, wniplctcd elementary, conipleted junior high, completed high school, and
This data was previously analyzed in Canaan, Pcllcgrini and Scsdto 1989 and Sescilo 1990, who
estimated earnings functions for Italy and examined the residual variance, concluding that there bas been
no significant increase in inequality. We thank them for their Insights and the Bank of Italy (or providing
the data.
The swvey was taken in 1981. but the data in that year deviates Irons the adjacent years along
enough dimensions to be highly suspect; we exclude it. No survey was iakcn in 1985.
We discuss the Italian tax system and its possible effects on earnings inequality betow.
23college or higher degree; age categories: under 21, 21-30, 3140. 41-50. 51-65, and over 65); for
our comparative regressions, we similarly segment the CPS dala, making the schooling calegones
none = completed grade 0-5; elcnientary = completed gnide 6-3; junior high = completed grade 9-
II; high school = completed grade 12-15; and college-i- = completed grade 16-i-. Note that 13W
does not contain information on the workers inquadraniento level.
Finally, we restrict our samples to full-time full-yeas- non-agricultural workers between the
ages oilS and 65 who arc not self-employed. Earnings are not lop-coded in 13W; we irlipute
topcoded CPS annual earnings at 1.45 limes the annual lopcode amount (following Katz and
Murphy 1992). \Ve do all of our analysis separately for men and women. 24
111.2 gj Education Compositions Qfth Labor Forces
First, we examine the levels and changes of the age and occupational structures in the two
countries. Table 6 presents the sample proportions for the live schooling and five age categories in
the two countries for men and women in 2978 and 1987. Note in particular the generally higher
level of schooling in the U.S. and the rough similarity of the age distributions. From the beginning
of this period to the end of this period, the proportion of Italian men in this sample who had not
completed high school fell 11% (from 663% to 593%), while the proponion of their American
male counterparts who had not completed high school (cli 32% (from 21.9% to 14.8%); the
proportion of italian men with college degrees rose 31% and the proportion of American men with
college degrees rose 24%. r-r Italian women, the proportionwho had not completed high school
fell 23% and the proportion with college degrccs rose 51%; the corresponding numbers for
American umen in the CPS sample arc -43% and 36%. In both countries, then, there was a
trend toward greater educational attainment among full- lime workers over this period.25 We will
return to these findings and their possible roles in explaining the trends in o\eralt inequality.
24 The male/female earnings differential is grcatcr jut the U.S. than in Italy, and is dropping faster
in the U.S. We refer die wader to Blau and Kahn 1993 for analysis of die gender earnings gap in Italy and
elsewhere.
25 Vc cut use these five age and five schooling levels to ereate 25 age-schooling categories, die
finest division possible for the Italian sample along the dimensions of schooling and experience. For
Americans, both men and women in both 1978 and 1987, the largest age-education categories are always
high school aged 21.30 and 31-40. The largest age-education categories in 1973 fcc italian men went
junior high aged 21-30 and cicinenlaty aged 51-65; in 1987, junior high and high school aged 31—10. In
1973, the largcstcatcgorics roe Italian women were high school and junior high aged 21-30: in 1937, high
school aged 21.30 and 31-40 (as in the U.S.). Apart from the generally higher level of schooling in die
U.S., the two countries look reasonably similar in terms of die distribution of age cohorts within schooling
categories, and Ml of the distributions satin to be moving toward older ;uid more educated populations
(although die share in the oldest category, 51-65, drops for everyone but Italiati wohulen).






NONE Italy 4.0 1.2 3.0 1.2
U.s. 2.2 1.3 1.2 0.7
J3LSffiffrA.JtY Italy 31.021.3 24.014.0
U.s. 7.7 4.5 5.5 2.7
JUNIOR HIGH Italy 31.736.8 28.527.7
U.s. 12.0 9.0 10.8 6.6
HIGH SCHOOL Italy 25.230.0 33.840.8
U. S. 56.057.8 64.966.0
COLLEGE+ Judy 8.1 10.6 10.7162
U.S. 22.127.4 17.724.0
AGE CAThGORY
18-20 Italy 3.6 1.6 7.1 2.6
U.S. 2.9 1.9 42Z2
21-30 Italy 23.521.0 34.927.7
U.s. 27.327.3 31.730.4
31-40 lusty 26.729.3 27.533.4
U.S. 26.732.1 22.1 30.4
41-50 Italy 23327.5 21.025.1
U.S. 21.221.0 20.420.7
51-65 Italy 22.820.6 9.511.2
U.S. 21.9 17.8 21.7 16.2
EXPERIENCE Italy 25.725.3 19.920.9
U.S. 22.0 20.7 21.2 19.8
Notes:
1)r,rcducationand age categories, thenumbergiven is the percentage of die particular gcndcrs
total sample of full-dine (till-year non-agricultural workers who arc not self-employed age 18-65
accounted for by particular categoiy.
2) Highest level completed in U.S.: None = completed grade 0-5, Elementary = 6-8. Junior High
= 9-11, High School=12-15, College+= 16÷.
3) Experience = mean oIagc category minus ycars-to-complction of schooling category minus six.
Sources oldata: Banca Ditalia, U.S. Current Population Survey.
25111.3r%ltlcauion EIrnin2s Differentials
We now examine differences and changes in the return to human capital characteristics,
Looking first at the raw evidence on the influenceof schoolingon earnings, significant cross
country diflerences appear to exist in education-earnings profiles. Table 7 presents raw (completed
high sctiool)I(did not complete high school), and (college degrce(cornplcled high school) avenge
earnings ratios for men and women in each countiy for four age groups (combining the youngest
twoinTable 6, 10 create the 18-30 category). Both ratios rise in every age-gender group from die
beginning of the pci od to the end of the period among Americans, and the collcge/lis gap rises in
all groups but one in Italy (men 41- 50). Yet, the hs/(less than Its) gap was smaller in 1987 than in
1978 in 6 of tue 8 age-gender groups in Italy (except age 31-40 for both men and women). By
1987, the ratios for Americans were greater titan or equal to the corresponding ratios for Italians in
every age-gender group.
Differences also seem to exist in the shape of the raw education-earnings profiles. In most
cases, the college/Its gip is greater than the hsf(less than Its) gap in the U.S.. but the opposite is
often true in Italy, particularly among the older cohorts and in the later years. This suggests that
education-earnings profiles tend to be convex in the U.S.andconcave in Italy.
We investigate these education-earnings relationships further by comparing the coefficients
from logarithmic earnings functions estimated separately for men and women in the two countries.
Tables 8 and 9 present the coefficients on experience (defined as the mean of the age category
occupied by a given observation minus the years-to-completion of the schooling category minus
six). experience squared, and three schooling levels (up to completed elementary, completed junior
high, and college degree +; completed high school is the excluded category) for ihe years 1918
through 19S7formen and women, respectively.
lucre are several interesting results from these regressions. First,judgingby the adjusted
It-squares. the explanatory power for the regressions are roughly comparable across the two
countries within gender groups. Second, while the returns to high school as well as college are
clearly rising for both men and women in the U.S.,thetrend is much less clear in Italy . indicating,
if anything, a weak trend toward lower returns to high school (relative to those with elementary or
less in particular) and higher returns to college.26
26 Note the largejuinp in returns to college formen in 1983. This jump cotncs primarily from those
crnploycd in public aduiinismntion; die return for those employed in 'indusuy actually falls stighdy.
26TABLE 7 EDUCATION EARNINGS RATIOS BY AGE GROUPS.
ITALY AND US., 1978-1987 (Excluding 1981 & 1985)
18 22O 83 84 Mi 81
MEN
18-30 Iialy(A] 1.131.14 1.23 1.21 1.161.14 1.20 1.11
Italy (B) 1.25 1.18 1.24 1.13 1.22 1.251.291.38
U.S. [A) 1.27 1.27 1.241.221.31 1.32 1.31 1.3$
U.S. (B) 1.261.241.23 1.29 1.33 1.35 1.431.48
31-40 Italy IA) 1.181.271.221.231.16 1.181.151.19
Italy [II] 1.141.021.071.06 1.25 1.081.08 1.27
U.S. (Al 1.31 1.34 1.3$ 1.41 1.37 1.35 1.41 1.40
U.S. (8) 1.291.271.241.26 1.31 1.34 1.41 1.41
41.50 Italy [A) 1.36lii 1.31 1.30 1.291.301.29 1.23
Italy [B) 1.241.01 1.25 1.21 1.191.241.07 1.19
U.S. (Al 1.321.301.301.35 1.431.381.40 lAO
U.S.(13) 1.431A31.44 1.41 1.451.451.49 1.49
51.65 Italy (A) 1.511.361.331.39 1.31 1.441.34 1.36
Italy [II] 1.281.451.331.12 1.331291.32131
U.S. (A) 1.331.321.321.32 1.381.327.36 1.36
U.S. (8) 1.561.51 1.51 1.501.56 1.561.59 1.58
WOMEN
18-30 Italy (Al 1.241.221.141.16 1.10 1.21 1.18 1.17
Italy (13] 1.061.021.23 1.14 1.281.131.28 1.30
U.S. (Al 1.241.241.221.33 1.31 1.331.38 1.30
U.S. (B] 1.311.331.35 1.381.371.381.45 1.51
31-40 Italy (AJ 1.201.321.15 1.24 1.381.241.23 1.24
Italy (6) 1.011.05 1.01 1.061.041.08 1.04 1.03
U.S. [A) 1.351.23 1.29 1.351.431.391.40 1.46
U.S. (BJ 1.441.461.43137 1.40 1.41 1.42 1.48
41-50 Italy (A) 1.391.301.33 1.37 1.191.321.26 1.27
Italy (B) 1.081.0$0.98 1.061.101.09 1.08 1.11
U.S. (A) 1.331.27 1.291341.361.33 1.41 3.46
U. S. [B) 1.441.47 1.43 1.391.461.44 1.47 3.50
51-65 Italy [A) 1.461.61 I.3S 1.381.431.37 1.33 lAO
Italy [II) 0.911.01 1.20 1.06 1.21 1.031.06 1.06
U.S.(A) 1.341.361.341391.421.321.341.41
U.S. (II) 1.421.43 1.501371.401.521.50 1.46
Italy(AJ and U.S.[A) =CompletcdHigh School IDidNot Complete High School average carniuigs ratio.
Italy(B)and U.S.(B) =CollcgeDegrce or mwv / Completed High School avenge earnings ratio.
Note:Earnings =annualwage and salary carnings, lull-time lull-year non-agiicultusal workers who
arc not sell-employed age 18-65. he-tax in U.S. post.tax in Italy.
Sources of Datx Banca D'Italia, U.S. Current Population Survey.
27TABLES EARNINGS FUNCTION COEFFICIENTS FOR MEN IN ITALY AND U.S., 1978-1987
(Excluding 198! & 1985)
78 79 80 82 83 84 86 87
EXPERIENCE Italy .39 .41 .3.4 .36 .36 .35 .34 .27
(divided by ID) (-03) (.04) (.03) (.02) (.03) (.02) (.02) (.02)
U.S. .45 .43 .42 .43 .45 .44 .48 .46
(.0!) (.0!) (.01) £01) (.01) (.0!) (.0!) (.01)
EXPERIENCE Italy-.55 -.56 -.50 -.5049 -.48 -.46 -.36
SQUARED (.0!) (.05) (.05) (.04) (.04) (.04) (.03) (.03)
(divided by 1000)
U.S. -.70 -.65 -.63 -.63-.66 -.64 -.69 -.67
(.02) (.02) (.02) (.02) (.02) (.03) (.02) (.03)
aELEMENTARY Italy-35-39 -.36-37-34 -.34 ..34 -.32
(.03) (.03) (.02) (.02) (.02) (.02) (.0 I) (.02)
-U.S.-39 -.41-.41 -.41-.46..42_47.47
(0.!) (0.!) (0.!) (0.!) (0.!) (0.2) (0.2) (0.2)
JUNIORIIIGII Italy -.2124-.23 -.26 -.23 -.23 -.23 -.19
(.02) (.03) (.02) (.02) (.01) (.02) (.0!) (.0!)
U.S.-.23 -.24 -.25 -.25 -.28 -.26 -.29 -.31
(0.!) (0.1) (0.!) (0.!) (0.!) (0.1) (0.!) (0.1)
COLLEGE+ Italy .22 .14 .18 .15 .27 .21 .16 .26
(.03) (.04) (.03) (.03) (.03) (.03) (.02) (.02)
U.S. .35 .3232 .333739 .43 .43


























































I) DcpcndcntVariable log of annual wage and salary earnings. fuII-timc full-ycar non-
agricultural workerswho arc not self-employed agc 18-65. Prc-tax in U.S., post-tax in Italy.
2) Excludcd education catcgory cornplctcd high school; All regressions also contain a conslauL
3) Standarderrors in parentheses.
Sourccs of Data: Banca Ditailia. U.S. Cuncnt PopulationSurvey.
28TABLE 9 EARNINGS FUNCTION COEFFICIENTh FOR WOMEN
INITALY AND U.S.. 1978-1927(Excluding 1981 & 1935)
78 79 80 82 83 84 86 87
EXPERIENCE Italy30 .27 .23 .24 .19 .20 .28 .18
(divided by 10) (.04) (.04) (.04) (.04) (.04) (.03) (.03) (.02)
U.s. .21 .22 .23 .22 .25 .25 .27 .30
(.0!) (.0!) (.0!) (.01) (.01) (.0!) (.0!) (.0!)
EXPERIENCE Italy-.50-.45-.39-.33 -.2.5-.29-.43-.24
SQUARED (.09) (.08) (.08) (.08) (.01) (.06) (.05) (.05)
(divided by 1000)
U.S.-.34-.36 -.36-36 -.42 -.42-.44-.50
(.0)) (.02) (.02) (.03) (.03) (.03) (.03) (.03)
<=ELEMENTARY Italy -.44 -.50-.43-.49-.43-.44-.42•.39
(.04) (.04) (.05) (.04) (.04) (.04) (.03) (.03)
U.S. -.37 -.35 -.40-.40-.40-.38-.42-.45
(.01) (.02) (.02) (.02) (.02) (.02) (.02) (.02)
JUNIORHiGH Italy-12 -.21-.13-.11-.20-.21 -.21-.20
(.04) (.04) (.03) (.03) (.03) (.03) (.02) (.02)
U.S. -.25 -.22-.23-17-.28-.25-.29-.31
(.01) (.01) (.01) (.01) (.02) (.02) (.02) (.02)
COLLEGE+ Italy.08 .08 .13 .15 .18 .13 .12 .14
(.05) (.05) (.05) (.04) (.04) (.03) (.03) (.02)
U.S. .36 .36 .38 36 .38 .39 .43 .45


























































I) Dependent Variable = logofannualwage and salary earnings,full-limelull-yeas non-
agricultural workers who arc not self-employed age18-65. Pie-taxin U.S_post-taxin Italy.
2) Excludededucationcategory = completed high school; AU regressions also contain a constani
3) Standard errorsinparentheses.
Sources01 Data: Banca DItaIia, U.S. Current Population Survey.
20lliird. making within-gender comparisons across the two countries: in each period. the
returns to high school and college arc higher and the experience-earnings profile is sleeper for
Aniencari men than for Italian men (excepting the return to completing high school relative to
completiiig junior high in 1982). While Italian women begin with steeper experience-earnings
profiles and a greater earnings deficit at the lowest educational category compared to American
women. these relationships are reversed by the end of the period after the greater growth in returns
to education and experience among American women (the return to a college degree is much
grcatcr for American women than Italian women throughout, but the gap is larger at the end of the
period).
Finally, making within-country comparisons across die genders: American men and women
have roughly similar returns 10 high school and college, while Italian women have a greater return
to a high school degree than Italian men when the comparison group is elementary or less, and
italianmen have asomewhat greater return to college.
111.4OverallEarnint,s Inequality
The trends in overall inequality arc shown in Table 10, which displays five measures of
earnings inequality for men and women: the 90% - 10%logearnings differential, the 90% - 50%
log earnings differential, the 50% - 10% log earnings differential, the standard deviation of log
earnings, and the standard deviation of log earnings residuals from separate regressions by gender-
year-country cells (i.e. the regressions presented inTables 8 and 9),as well as the standard
deviation of log earnings for men inindustry inItaly and manufacturing in the U.S. In all cases
but the 50-10differentialfor women intheearlier years inequalityis greater forAmericans than
for their Italian gendercounterparts.Inall butone case,thereis cvidencc of anincreasein
inequalityinthe U.S.andsomewhat weaker evidence of a decrease ininequality in Italy -the
exception is the 90% - 50% log earnings differential for men in Italy,which increasessteadily after
197927
27 This suggests that for men Italian Libor market institutions may have sucdcd in keeping up
wagesatdie bottom but not in preventing substantial wage drift at die top. The same does not seem to he
tnt forwomen. Note inwell that the 90-SO differential is greater for Italian menthanfor italian women,
perhapsrcflecting the greater returns to a college degree for meninItaly,while mostother measuresof
inequality aregreater(or Italianwomenthan forItalian men
30TABLE 10 MEASURES OF INEQUALITY OF LOG EARNINGS, ITALY AND U.S.
ITALIAN MEN
2Q12 jQjQ Standard Stand. dcv.Stand dcv.
differentialdifferentialdifferential deviation of residualsin Industry
1918 £27 .470 357 .402 353 .409
1979 .742 .336 .405 .410 353 .420
1980 .742 .377 365 .367 319 377
1982 .762 .405 357 373 320 .387
1983 324 361 363 370 .311 .364
1984 .693 379 .314 374 328 333
1986 .729 .419 310 .337 .288 317
1987 .734 .446 .288 355 311 371
AMEffiCAN MEN
2Q10 SLJ.Q Standard Stand. dcv.Stand dcv.
differentialdifferentialdifferential deviation of residualsin Industry
1978 1.206 333 .672 .531 .466 .471
1979 1.216 349 .663 .535 .473 .512
1980 1.261 .565 .6% 378 322 309
1982 1.257 .564 .693 .564 302 520
1983 1.343 .606 .742 .586 316 .518
1984 1379 .598 .781 £32 .570 .543
1986 1.409 .629 .780 .638 .563 .575
1987 1.452 .631 £21 .627 349 382
ITALIANWOMEN
ycaz 2Q10 2Q50 SQJfl Standnrd Stand. dcv.
differentialdifferentialdifferential deviation of vrsiduak
1978 .916 336 380 .447 .408
1979 .869 256 .613 .437 338
1980 .787 .288 .500 .435 .400
1982 £67 .342 .525 .447 .407
1983 .860 314 347 All 388
1984 .693 241 .452 371 330
1986 .818 .268 350 398 358
1987 .693 251 .442 343 305
AMERICANWOMEN
9J-10 2Q50 S&1D Standard Stand dcv.
diflerentin]differentialdifferential deviation of residuals
1978 1.082 348 .535 .484 .443
1979 1.124 368 .556 .472 .433
1980 1.054 .543 311 314 .473
1982 1.099 360 339 310 .471
1983 1.161 371 391 332 .491
1984 1204 .580 .624 348 .507
1986 1.253 .616 .636 .556 309
1987 2322 .629 .693 364 311
SourcesofData:Dana D'ItaIia,U.S. Cuncni PopulationSurvcy.
31We do not have a conclusiveexplanationfor the lack of a U-shape in Italian individual-
levelinequality which we see in the aggregate sectonil data.prcsented in the previous two sections.
One possible explanation is that the composition of our sample of individuals may lead to results
v,liicli do not reflect the changes in metal-manufacturing inter-inquadramento inequaiity, or the
other measures of inter-industry and inter-occupational inequality presented above. Less than 50%
of the BD1 sample (substantially less for women) arc employed in industry, and when we analyze
this sector separately, we do Find a risc in the standard deviation of log earnings for men in 1987 to
a level above that in 1983.28 though it still drops from 1983 through 1986 (Final column of Table
10).Anotherpossibility is that "industry" contains sectors which had a different expr.riencc than
nietal-nianufacturing; unfortunately,wecannotseparateout these oilier sectors inthisdata set.
II 1.5Possible Explanations £i: 1k Divergent Trends in Overall inenualityinhair imd lflc
United States
We recognize that there are many conceivable explanations for these divergent results on
the cocfficients in the earnings functions and the dispeision of earnings in the two countries. These
range (ruin differences in technology (or the relationship of earnings and productivity within
individual flints), to differences in the imbalances between the supply and demand for skills
(including the effect of the price of education on labor supply, college being virtually free in Italy),
to the possibility of different methods of non-price rationing in the labor markets (including various
types of discrimination), to the changing influence of taxes (which are netted from the Italian but
not the U.S. data).
We certainly cannot distinguish definitively among these alternatives at this point Yet.
because we find the difference in the trends of inequality to be so sulking, we close this section by
examining sonic possible explanations for the movement toward rising inequality in the U.S. and
stable-to-Ialling inequality in Italy, as displayed in Table 10. An explanation which is logically
possible involves the distribution of skills in the two countries: the above results might be
consistent with a sharper trend toward higher educational attainment among fully employed
workers, and thus toward greater overall inequality in the U.S. Recall, however, front the
discussion above (Table 6) that while the average levels of education are higher in the U.S.. the
trends in educational attainment seem to be going in the same basic directions in the two countries -
in fact, the proportion of fully employed workers with college degrees or more has increased moit
sharply in Italy than in the U.S. for both men and women.29
The sample of women in indusuy is too small to be reliable.
29 On the other hand, a given increase in the proportion of college educated workers might be
expected to produce more ovcxull inequality in the U.S., given the gcnenlly higher returns to sdiooling.
32The findings on thetrends ininequality could also be consistent with differential changes
inthe occupational or industrial structures in the two countries. In fact, the share of blue collar
workers has been falling and the share of white collar workers risingforboth men and wonien in
the Italian sample: the share of blue collar workers among men fell from 59% in 1978 io 49% in
1986 while the share of white collar workers rose from 41% to 51%; among women, the share of
blue collar workers fell fiuni 49% in 1978 to 40% in 1986 and the share of white collar workers
rose (mm 50% to 60%,30 As for the industrial distribution, the category Industry" is the largcst
among men, but has dropped over this period from 48% of the workers in 1978 to 39% in 1986.
while the calegories "public administration" and the residual category have been growing. Among
wonien,public;t(lIitiiustraIion has always been die largest category (rising from 33% of die
workers in 197$ to 43% in 1986). and has also grown relative to industry; trade is the third-largesi
category ;utioiig women, as conipared to transortaIion and Cuiniininicatioiis aniongmen.3
Overall, then, there has been a shift away from blue collar and industrial jobs and a shut
toward white collar and public administration jobs among both men and women in Italy over this
period. The industrial and occupational categories arc not strictly comparable with those in the
Cr5, so t do not present a direct comparison, but these results suggest that Italy has teen
undergoing a de-indusirialization similar to other Western countries, indicating that the explanation
for the divergence of the trends in inequality will probably not be found here.
Furthermore, when we calculate the effects of between-industry shifts in labor demand on
the relative demands for different skill and gender groups in Italy (using the methodology of Katz
and Murphy 1992 and Katz. Loveman and Blanchflowcr 1993. who find evidence of shifts toward
more educated workers in the U.S. and elsewhere), based on six industries and six gender-skill
groups, we find a shift against workers with less than a high school degree, a slight shift in favor of
workers who completed high school, and a much greater shift toward workers with a college degree
or more for both inca and women,32 We conclude that the fall in returns to high school, the less-
30 with the fmdings for die mcial-manufacturing stmx presented in section II.
above,
31 Nute that we usc 1986 for the ending date here because the industrial and occupational
classification systcms change in 1987.
32 The six industries arc "industry," "public adminisintioiC "IIaLJC," "public transport arid
comiununicaiion, "banking." and "other." mc six gcndcr-skill groups arc did not complete high sduioh.
complctcd high school, and college degree foe men and womcn. We usc 1918 as the base year and 1956
asthic ciiding yar due to the change in the occupational classification system in 1987. The value of the
shift away front men who did not complete high school, as measured by the difference in the logaritluns it
the indexes of relative demands from 1978 to 1986. is 132, toward men who completed high school
.095. toward men with a college degree .158. away from women who did not complete high school -.003,
toward women who completed high school Jfl, toward women with a college degree 253.
33than-dramatic rise in the returns to college, and the drop in overall inequality in Italyare not due to
between-industry shifts in labor demand away from more educated workers.33
The influence of taxes, which arc netted from the Italian data but not from the U.S. datais
another candidate explanation for the observed trends in inequality in Italy and the U.S.The
Italiantax system is cifeclivelyprogressive both because of the structure of marginal tax rates and
the lump-sumnature ofdeductions. While pre-taxearnings have beenfound tobemoreunequal
thanpost-tax earnings, the progressivity of the tax system seems to have decreased between l982
and J93734 Ibis suggests that while the influence of taxes might contribute to the difference in
the level of inequality in the two samples, it probably does not drive the difference in the trends; if
anything, we would expect a bias toward increasing inequality in Italian post-tax earnings from the
decreasing prngrcssivity of the Italian tax structure over this period.
One addiuional pocihiliy that we Ibid appealing is that differences in tIme nature amul
evolution of labor niarket institutions in the two countries have contributed to the low unit falling
inequality in Italy and the high and rising inequality in the U.S.- specifically, labor niarket
institutions (union contracts and relatively centralized bargaining structures, for example) act to
nan-ow earnings inequality to a greater extent In Italy and have not been deregulated or otherwise
dismantled to the extent they have been in the U.S. This final interpretation is consistent with the
generally lower returns to a college degree and the less steep experience-earnings profiles in Italy.
as sclI as the general thrust of the evidence provided in section II on the metal-manufacturing
seclor.
V Conclusions:Mechanisms Outside the Regular Eeonomy Influencing Overall Italian
Vuge Inequality
flie overall picture of Italypresentedinthischapter isofa country with a compressed
wage structure which is not yet undergoing the rapid decompression experienced elsewhere during
the 1980s. The decline of intcr-inquadz-ainento, inter-industry and blue collar / white collar
differentials during the I970s caine to a stop and was slightly reversed during the 1980s, but these
33 The cvhicnceon the growth of educational categories within industries is somewhat morn mixed:
while thc share of workers with a high school degree or above rises or remains stable between 1978 and
1986 in every industry except tue residual other', the share with a college degree actually falls slightly in
three industries: public administration, Thanking, and odicc This suggests diaL there may not have
been inacases in the demand hr skilled workers within these industrics keep in mind, however, that
public adminiscration and banking are both relatively politically controlled, so that their hiring
practices may tic driven by conccnis other than the technological needs ftt skills (political patronage, (or
example).
SeeNardecchia and Patriarca 1992, Ricciardclli 1992 and Di liclla and Parisi 1992.
34differentials did not rise back to the pre-1980s levels despite the relorms of the mid- l980s. Over
the 1978-1987 period, measures of individual-level earnings inequality indicate, if anything, a trend
toward a less unequal distribution. This trend is in marked contrast to the experience in the U.S.,
where inequality clearly increased during the 1980s.
There seem to have becn three iniportant determinants of this evolution of wage
differentialsin Italy over the last twentyyears. First, the egalitarian ideolopy of Italian unions.
which in times of union strength such as the 1970sledto the institutionalization of equalizing
practicessuch as low contracted wage differentials and egalitarian escalator clauses. Second, the
dynamic of inflation in conjunction with the different escalator regimes that Italy has experienced
during this period. Third. the evolution of technolopy, productivity differentials and related skill
shortwcs in the labor markets, which most likely primarily influenced the individually-contractcd
portion of total compensation.
One might have expected that the clearbreakintheevolution of wage differentials around
1982-83 would have offered the chance to evaluate the relative importance of these factors.
llowcver, the simuttaneous nature of these processes makes such a task impossible with the
available information: the years when the compression of wage differentials came to a stop, or at
least to a slowdown, were also the years in which major discontinuities occurred in the evolution of
the three factors identified above: union strength, as measured by strike activity and by
membership, significantly weakened; inflation, After the explosion of the 1970s, started a
downward trend that lasted until the late 1980s; and, finally, the process of industrial restructuring
induced by die oil shocks and by Ut computer revolution likely caused changes in the dcnianód
skill composition of the labor force, not necessarily and not immediately matched by changes in the
composition of' supplies.
Nevertheless, the evidence provided by the comparison with the U.S. suggests that the
continuing compression in the regular sector is likely not attributable to markct forces. Both
countries appear to have experienced the sort of trend toward a more educated and more heavily
while collar workfotce that accompanies de-indusuialization. In addition, the analysis of between-
industry labor demand shiftsprovidesno evidence of a shift awayfrom moreeducated workersin
eithercountry.Despite these similar labor supplyandlabor demand indicators,measured
inequalily has been relatively high and increasing in the U.S.andlowanddecreasing in Italy.
Thus,there stems to be mom enough for alternative explanations for the Italian case.
It is difficult to deny that egalitarian institutions, and in particular the scala mobile, bore
large responsibility for the wage compression of the 1970s. We cannot say how much of that
compression was actually expected in 1975 when the scala mobile payments were first equalized
across all workers; most likely, the probability of many years of inflation in double figures was
35undcrcstimaicd at that time.35 Indeed, the fact that contracted differentials starledto increase in
1979. leaving indention as the primary fac:or causing compression through 1983,suggests that
unions might have rcaJizeJ that tue conipression was becoming excessive. Yet, the 1975system
was not modified until 1983 and only in 1986 was its egalitarian nature substantially changed. The
fact that it took so long to reform die scala mobile leads to the suspicion that theimplied
compression was not too far liuni what the market could bear. On the other hand, episodes like the
march of the 40.000 in 1920 and the referendum against the scala mobile in 1985suggest that the
compression had already rcached the threshold of sustalnabilicy by the early 1980s. and Indeed in
subsequent years the system was changed.
Before the reform of the scala mobile, the individual superminimum was theescape valve
through which the parties could make bearable the compression caused by inflation. One might
even suspect that the discqualizing effect of the drift was part of some kind of implicit agreement
between employers and unions to control the compressioncaused byunexpectedly high inflation.
Unions might have been attached to the egalitarian scala mobile for internal political reasons,
allowing the drift to correct for the unexpected effects. Uowevcr, we do not have evidence on die
validity of these speculations, and if they were true, one would he lefl with the question: why
wasn't the excessively egalitarian nature of the escalator system reformed before the mid-1980s, if
even the majority within the unions may have been dissatisfied with it?
Indeed, if the system had been modified by giving more weight to contracted increases, as
for example in Swcdcn,36 unions might have acquired more control over wage determination and
wage dispersion. But, precisely the comparison with the Swedish experience suggests that the
instniment through which compression is achieved (escalator in Italy, contracted increases in
Sweden) is probably irTclcvane what matters is the extent to which compression can be imposed.
and in both countries the sustainable threshold was reached around the same period.
Why, then, were employers unable to undo the compression? For employers, individual
supernsininia were not a costless instrument for controlling wage compression: given the
compensation increases granted by the contracts and by the scala niobilc to low inquadrantento
levels, larger suptoninima at high levels implied a greater growth in total labor costs. Therefore,
the discqualizing potential of individual superminima was somewhat limited by constraints on total
labor cost increases. These constraints were likely to have been particularly binding during the
Franco Mattel, one of the Conrandustria experts who bargained the 1975 agreement wrote
afterwards: 'The compression effect of the new system was perceived, but it was considered as justified iii
the short period emergency [to protcct low wages (mm the oil shock inflationJ. Even mysclC looking hick
atmynotes, in Novcmbrl9l4ldidnotcxpectthatw would hadan inflationratearound2o% for
somanyalthougbtthatwewcatapofinflutd,inp,uonwijssoougoingiobe
eliminatcd, (Mattel 1981, 141).
36 See Edin and Holmlund 1993.period of high inflation,and thismight explainwhythe individualsupennininia didnot fully offset
the effectof the scata mobile before1983.Yet, thepuzzle remains as to why wage inequality did
not increase back to its levels of the early 1970s after inflation sloweddown,particularly 1ien
technological changes probably required, if anything, a more marked trend toward larger
compensation diflerentialsacross skills,asoccuaed in the U.S. and elsewhere.
A credible partialexplanationto thispuzzleis that otherremediesto wage compression,
perhapsless costly to employers, seem to have proliferated inthenon-regular areas ofthe
economy, not covered by our empirical analysis above. For example, Italy is among the developed
countries with the greatest levels and highest recent growth rates of self-employment: non-
agricultural self employment as a proportion of total civilian employment grew from 13.9% in
1979 to 22.3% in 1990 (OECD l992). Italian self employment may be a consequence of the
presence of restrictive labor market regulations imposed by unions, in particular hiring and firing
cost.s (I3ertola 1990). It is also possible that the compression of wage differentials for non-self
employed workers might have spurred the diffusion of self employment: some of the high skilled
workers who saw their earnings limited by the egalitarian union policies may have offered
themselves as freelaneers (perhaps even to the same firms that were previously hiring them as
employees) with the aim of getting better returns to their skills. Though we are not aware of any
explicit quantitative evidence on this link between wage compression in the unionized sector and
self employment, it seems to be a credible hypothesis, consistent with anecdotal evidence. If this is
die case, then the egalitarian efforts of unions have been only partially successful: wages of regular
employees may have been compressed, but an increasing number of workers could have avoided
the compression by joining self employment.
Italy is also well known for having a large underground economy and, almost by definition.
the underground economy is something over which official wage-setting institutions and unions
have no legal control and minimal influence. As in the case of self employment, one is tempted to
attribute die size of the undcrground economy to the existence of labor market and fiscal regulation
that employers view as burdensome. Indeed, the available estimates of the underground economy
for Italy are larger than most estimates (or other western countries, where labor market regulations
are generally less restrictive(Dallago1988; Dallago l99O). In line with this view, the
An point of comparison, the share of self employed workers grew from 7.1% in 1979 to 1.6% in
1990 in die US. The U.K seems to be the country with the greatest growth of the proportion of sell
employed, from 6.6% in 1979 to 11.6% in 1990. The share of self-employed workers in die complete
Bank of Italy swvcy rises from 17.5% in 1978 to 23% iii 1987; we do not use these observations (cc the
wage inequality cilculations in section lIt Liectuse we have no way of distinguishing full-time sell-
employed(rainpart-time. 3 Dallago1988 reports that recent estimates oftheItalian underground GDP asa proportionof
total GDP nuigc from 6% to 30.1%, with most estimates in double figures.Forthe US. the analogous
37compression of wage differentials in the unionizedseccorcould be a stimulant for the underground
economy: if sonic of the compression is achieved by raising low wages (an hypothesized effect of
the scala mobile). it becomes difficult for employers to profitably maintain ovcrgruuntr activities
involving less skilled workers.Thoughhiring lessskilledworkers into underground activities not
controlled by unions may be infeasible fir large companies, the reader should keep in mind that die
Italian productive structure is constituted in large part by very sinai! firms.
Yet, in contrast to self employment, it is difficult to find any reliable evidence of a
significantly increasing trend in the underground economy inItaly in recent years.Whilethelack
of reliability is no doubt in large part inherent in any attempt to measure underground activities, the
official statistics that do exist (a revised series of Italian (JNP 1mm the central statistical office,
ISTAT) show that the non-explidtly measured portion of national product went (miii 15.3% in
1980 to 17.7% in 1985 and then slightly decreased to 16% in 1986 (Dallago 1988, 73_75).39t
thus seenis more difficult than in the situation of self employment to build a prima facie case for a
link between the trend in the compression of wage differentials and possible diffusion of the
underground economy
Another manner in which a & facto wider wage distribution niay have been achieved
despite the compression documented above involves the so called Contraui di Formazione e
Lavoro:speciallabor contracts for workers between 14 and 29 years of age. Permanently
introduced by law in 1984 after several previous experiments, they require employers to provide
some training in return for lower wages and social contributions. In contrast to standard jobs, the
contracts are temporary (24 months); at the expiration of the contract, the employer can decide
iiethcr to hire the wker for a lifetime position without having to consider other unemployment
queues, and financial incentives for transitions into pennanent contracts arc provided by the
government. The number of young workers hired under these contracts grew from 10.694 in 1984
to 529.297 in 1989. The biggest jump was between 1986 and 1987 when the number of hirings
grew from 229.126 to 402,586; this jump was influenced by a modification to the law providing
employers with larger wage and social contribution savings. The number of new Cons'raiti di
Formazione e Lavoro has started to slightly decline only recently, down to 469.050 in 1990.40
The available data indicate that approximately 50% of these contracts (40% in the south) are
eventually transformed into permanent contracts (Ministero del Lavoro 1988-1991).
ilie popularity of these contracts among both young workers and employers is consistent
with the view that a less compressed wage distribution Is welcomed by both groups (possibly at the
estimates rnngc from 2.6% to 33%, with very few estimates in double figures. Sec also Dcaglio 1984 and
key 1985 for further discussion of the Italian underground economy.
39 Note. however, that only a part of this change is attributable to tue actual growth of tue
underground economy; the rest is due to a revision in statistical techniques.
40 This amounts to approximately 3% of the total non-agricultural paid work force.
38expense of unemployed older workers who would have to be hired under standard permanent
contracts), paiiicularly given the oft-stated charge that these employment relationships do not
really serve their official function of providing young workers with meaningful special training.
Frontthe employers'point of view the advantages are fairlyobvious,but these contracts are likely
to representadesirableallernative to unemploymentor to employmentinthe undergroundeconomy
forthe young workers as well. Youth unemployment has been relatively high in Italy in recent
years: the percentage of total unemployment constitutedbyjob seekers between the agesof 14and
24fluctuated around61-62% between 1978 and 1983. declining thereañcrto 54% in 1987 and lo
48% in 1990 (QECD1978-1990). MostLikely, many oftheseyoung workers have beenfinding
jobsin theunderground economy.But evenif the amount of underground employment hidden in
the official youth unemployment figures is significant, the basic conclusion we draw from this
evidence is unchanged: it seems that by imposing their egalitarian aspirations on the regular sector
of the economy, Italian unions may have ended up limiting the size of this sector.
The evidence we present in the first three sections of this chapter indicates that wage
differentials have indeed been compressed in the regular sector of the economy.Yet, this
concluding section suggests that this very compression may well have contributed to the (light
away from the regular sector at both ends of the skill distribution: high skilled workers mayhave
left to seek the unrestricted returns to self employment, while less skilled entr.mts were induced to
accept lower paying training contracts, were forced into the more precarious underground
economy, or remained unemployed. These mechanisms may well, in mm, have contributed to a
greater overall degree of inequality than is apparent in our analysis of wage differentials in the
regular sector of the Italian economy.
39DATA APPENDIX
ASSOLOMBARDA
Assolombarda is the association of private employers in the Lombardyregion. Tue data set
is based on a survey of the associated firms in the Milan area. Thesurvey has been taken in
October and April of each year since 1976.butnot all of the surveys, particularly at the beginning
of the sample. are available.Foreach firm and inquadramento-levcl cell the survey provides the
avengeof eachcompensation component received by the workersinthat ccli; individual finns
cannot be identified, however. In 1988therewas achange inthe design ofthesurvey,butfor the
nietal-tuanufacturing sector (the one we analyze), previous datahavebeen readjustedby
Assolonibardato ensurecomparabilityacrossyears.Weare, however, lessthan fullyconfident
about the consistency of these readjustnieius, sincesonicapparent discontinuities have not been
clintinated: therefore, we use cross time comparisons in this data set only when the regularity of the
data scents acceptable. -
\Ve have access to firm-level information only for the October surveys Iron, 1933 through
1990. For the other years we rely on the published averages across firms for each inquadrarncnto
level.
I3ANCA DTFALI A
The Bank of Italy survey of Italian households was first collected in 1977. In 1985 the
survey was not done and the data for 1981 are not considered to be sufficiently representative by
the experts at the l3anca D'ltalia. Post-1987, the sunicyisbeing conducted bi-annually.
Data arc collected on a representative cross- section of Italian households by a private
company for the Banca D'ftalia. The survey has been mainly designed to provide information on
consumption and savings behavior; therefore, the information available for the estimation of
earnings functions and in general the information available for labor market research is somewhat
limited.
Sce also: l3anca D'It-alia, "I bilanci delle famiglie Italiane", in Supplenienti aJ Bolletlino
Staci.stico. Note nietodologiche e informazione statistiche., various years; and Banca d'Italia, "It
indagini canipionarie sui bilanci delle lamiglie italiane', Nuntero speciale dci Contributi alI'analisi
econoniica, 1986.
PEDERMECCANICA
rcclcriiicccanica is the national accriation of private melal-manufacturing finns. ibis (kita
set is based on a sample of the associated firms and provides, for each inquadratuento level, the
cross-finn average total monthly compensation and the cross-firm average contractual plus scala
40mobile compensation. It also provides the proportion of workers in each inquadramentolevel.Dala
are available from 1976through1990.
MINISTERO I2EL. LAVORO
This data set is based on a survey of 11,000 plains and is sponsored by the Minister of
Labor. Until 1977. only finns with more than 5 employees were included. Post-1977. the survey is
limited to firms with more than 50 employees.
The data used in figure I is the average hourly blue collar and trainees' compensation.
computed as the total monthly base compensation paid to these workers divided by the total
number of hours. The series was discontinued in 1985. A new series was started in 1986 but the
data arc not yet available.
NATIONAL ACCOUNTS
We have used the New Series (1970-1939) of the National Accounts data published by
ISTAT (Isuituto Nazionale di Stauisuica), Collana di Informazione, edizione 1990. a. 10.
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